This paper presents the first attempt to examine the political consequences of internationally-funded programs that target local non-governmental organizations (NGOs). The number of NGOs has grown exponentially over the past 20 years in the developing world. Many of these are local organizations that have established strong ties to international partners and agencies. While the mission of NGOs is often humanitarian, environmental, or tied directly to the provision of specific goods and services, we suggest that their impact is also profoundly political. Injections of international resources into underdeveloped, often clientelistic societies can fundamentally change the nature of the local political arena, affecting access to economic resources, social benefits, and ultimately, the quality of democratic representation. We analyze the impact external resources have on politics by examining a series of World-Bank funded projects based in the Brazilian Amazon from 1995-1998. We show that World Bank funding designed to channel resources to local groups had powerful effects in the political arena, increasing electoral support for the left in the 1998 presidential race. This paper has important implications for the growing role of NGOs and their influence on politics in the developing world.
Introduction
Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) continue to increase in number, size, and scope. They range from large international NGOs (those that operate in more than one country) to small associations of peasant farmers. The number of international NGOs (those that operate in more than one country) has grown over the last century from 176 in 1909 to 28,900 in 1993 (Hulme and Edwards 1997, 4) . Some estimate international NGOs now funnel more aid to developing countries than the United Nations (Mathews 1997) . The growth of NGOs is paralleled by their increasing ability to mobilize both resources and support. A growing percentage of development assistance provided by organizations such as the United Nations, the World Bank, the United States Agency for International Development, and the European Union is channeled through local NGOs.
For example, from 1990 to 1994 the percentage of European Union relief aid channeled through NGOs grew from 47% to 67% (Economist 1999) . More than 70 percent of World Bank-supported projects approved in 1999 involved NGOs and civil society in some way (World Bank 2000) . Somewhere between 10 and 15 percent of all aid to developing countries (over $6 billion) is now allocated through NGOs (Overseas Development Institute 1996) .
In addition to their growing numbers, NGOs are increasingly concerned with targeting groups and sectors that were previously excluded both economically and politically. Such sectors traditionally have not had the resources or organization to participate independently in political life but now find themselves able to gain access to increased funding.
What are the political consequences of expanding NGO funding within previously ignored social sectors? Donations from abroad to local NGOs certainly address a variety of important issues, but their influence may also spill over into politics. Investments in grassroots organizations may have significant unanticipated effects in local political life: mobilizing previously excluded sectors, empowering new political entrepreneurs, and providing alternatives to existing clientelistic networks. While increases in NGO activity have been massive, there has been no investigation into their political side-effects.
We provide the first examination of the political impact of internationally-funded NGOs. We focus on one aspect of politics: voting behavior. Specifically, we test for a correlation between NGO funding and changes in electoral returns in the Brazilian presidential elections of 1994 and 1998. Normally it would be difficult to track international NGO funding to specific geographic units. But in the Brazilian state of Rondonia, the World Bank provided the overwhelming majority of foreign NGO funding between 1994 and 1998. 1 The World Bank's Planafloro project, in addition to a much smaller program administered by the G7, disbursed roughly $10 million in grants to local NGOs in 37 of Rondonia's 40 municipalities. 2 These grants are well documented and represent a vast majority of the resources for local NGOs in Rondonia during the period under investigation. These funds also represent the first time significant resources have been made available to local NGOs in Rondonia (Aparicio and Garrison 1999) . In addition, presidential elections were held in 1994 and 1998 with the same two candidates as front-runners in both elections. Consequently, we can track exactly where the funds were spent and estimate their correlation with the presidential vote. We find a significant relationship between the inflow of resources from abroad and changes in the presidential vote: NGO funding was positively associated with votes for the left. This suggests that internationally-funded NGOs with humanitarian and developmental goals can have a profound influence on politics. The results are statistically and substantively significant and hold up to a number of diagnostic tests and alternate model specifications.
The paper is organized as follows. Section one builds theory and hypotheses on the relationship between NGO activity and voting behavior, drawing from the existing literature on international funding, NGOs, and domestic politics. Section two describes the Brazilian Planafloro project in more detail, justifying its use as a strong test of the hypotheses derived from the theoretical literature. Section three addresses issues of measurement and model specification. Section four presents our results. Section five concludes the paper by providing an interpretation of the results along with their implications and limitations.
Theory
Since World War II, both bilateral and multilateral donor agencies have pursued what is called the New Policy Agenda, recognizing the important role NGOs play in poverty alleviation, social welfare, and the development of civil society (Robinson 1993 (Edwards and Hulme 1996; Clarke 1998, 40) . Are NGOs reshaping the political arena? Or are their activities-and impact-limited strictly to the humanitarian or environmental goals they expound? Most previous work in this area has been produced by NGO activists or by social scientists with strong connections to funding agencies (Clarke 1998) . 4 Their studies rarely examine the NGOs' role in politics, emphasizing instead their progress toward publicly-stated goals.
We use existing theory and observations from the field to derive a set of hypotheses that link international funding and NGOs to electoral change. To simplify, we divide the literature into theories that posit NGOs can influence politics and theories that posit NGOs have no impact on politics.
NGOs and Political Mobilization
An infusion of external resources for NGOs could have a positive or negative impact on their political activity. On one hand, increasing resources may encourage and empower groups to press for political change. On the other, additional funds may actually have a de-mobilizing effect. We discuss each possible outcome (positive or negative) in turn, linking the extant theory with observations from field-work in Rondonia. The politicization of NGOs is apparent in a number of different areas. NGOs are now more likely to devise strategies and use activities in health care programs and agricultural cooperatives to help organize peasants so that they can challenge local elites (Clarke 1998, 42) . Often, no attempt is made to conceal the NGO's political objectives:
the NGO becomes openly involved in political campaigning and protest actions. NGOs not only challenge the state directly, their presence can form communal alliances that build institutions which challenge local, religious, or commercial elites (Clarke 1998, 44) .
As new services and outlets for political expression become available, the clientelistic ties binding the population to politically powerful bosses become threatened. NGOs, therefore, may have a decidedly political effect. They can provide political space and political opportunities for citizens to press their demands on government (Segarra 1997; Lehman 1990; Loveman 1991) .
Several specific mechanisms could be at work. First, external resources have an important organizational effect by keeping small community organizations alive, by expanding their organizational efforts, or by creating the organizations in the first place.
In the aggregate, therefore, external funding leads to increased numbers of meetings and increased contact between the NGO and the electorate. Increased associational activity exposes people to alternative political viewpoints, causing them to consider alternative political programs. Second, external resources influence politics through a demonstration effect. As organizational activity increases, community members will observe the good deeds associated with politically affiliated community organizations. As Nylen (1997) notes, one of the political strategies of the Brazilian Partido dos Trabalhadores (Workers' Party; PT) to increase its presence in rural areas is to build "a reputation based on 'good works', competence, and honesty" (Nylen 1997: 445 Increased resources for NGOs could produce political change not only through political mobilization, but through the possible anesthetizing effect of increased resources, demobilizing previously active political groups. NGO activity coupled with an increasing reliance on foreign resources may actually discourage political activism. The most extreme argument in this literature posits that any form of institutionalization-the kind NGOs are likely to foster-weakens social movements since their effectiveness depends on random spontaneity (Frank and Fuentes 1990, Piven and Cloward 1977) .
Less extreme arguments see the source of corruption not in the institutionalization of NGOs, but in their ties to government and external sources of funding. Because NGOs often enter into contracts with government to provide a wide array of social services, NGOs become less willing to criticize those in office (Rivera 1992; Sethi 1992) .
Moreover, as external funding becomes important, NGO survival depends increasingly on keeping the channels of external funding open. Less energy is devoted to organizing political protest and more energy is devoted to the aims and goals of the international donor (Smillie 1995), making it more difficult to rally the same numbers of people to participate in strikes or political demonstrations.
To some extent the STR in Nova Londrina has experienced the anesthetizing effect mentioned above. In 1993, a group of farmers organized under the STR began experimenting with honey production under the direction of an intermediary environmental NGO funded by European government and non-governmental aid. Once honey production reached significant levels, the participating farmers formed an agricultural cooperative to process and sell their products. The cooperative and the STR from which it formed are no longer working closely together as they did before. An exleader of the STR lamented that the cooperative is more interested in a purely economic solution to the problems of small farmers and no longer sees a role for political organization around issues that face this population. Moreover, international donors avoid supporting groups with an overt political affiliation. When considered for funding by an international NGO, the cooperative removed evidence of any ties to the STR and other labor union organizations. While this helped maintain the continued flow of outside resources to subsidize the organization's activities, such a posture did nothing to lessen the gap between the cooperative and the STR. Demobilization of key members in the STR leadership was the result.
NGOs and the Status Quo
Funding local NGOs may have no overall political effect: NGOs merely provide a range of goods and services to the poor more efficiently, and more effectively than government bureaucracies (Uphoff 1993) . NGOs, according to this view, address the need for developing countries to shed themselves of wasteful and costly state bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises that crowd out more productive investment. The inefficiencies associated with bloated bureaucracies and state-owned enterprises also prevent citizens in the developing world from receiving the same level of basic services (health, education, sanitation) enjoyed by their counterparts in the industrialized West.
The empirical evidence that NGOs more effectively reach the poorest segments of the population and provide services in a more efficient manner is mixed. Recent studies of NGO performance in Africa and Latin America indicate that NGOs may not be the most efficient providers of goods and services and do not always reach the poorest segment of the population (Edwards and Hulme 1996) . Here the emphasis is on the provision of social services in a cheap and efficient manner rather than on the possible social and political consequences. Whereas some argue there will be a positive political effect (in the sense of empowering previously marginalized groups in society), those that adopt the more skeptical view contend there is no connection between the more efficient provision of public goods and politics. 
Model and variables
Our model is designed to test the relationship between foreign funding and electoral returns in presidential elections. Specifically, we estimate the impact of NGO dollars on changes in voting behavior from 1994 to 1998. We limit our analysis to the Presidential election for both methodological and theoretical reasons.
Focusing on the presidential race provides us with a nearly ideal environment in which to test our hypotheses. The two front-running candidates were the same in both elections, and ran on nearly identical platforms in both years. The two main candidates The use of data from state and local elections would force us to confront significant individual candidate effects due to the ideological diversity within Brazilian political parties. These effects could severely confound our results. In local races, the candidates can vary substantially from one year to the next. Further, while elections for state and federal deputy are technically statewide races, many candidates concentrate their campaigns in specific geographic areas. This is especially common in a frontier state like Rondonia where travel can be difficult. These geographic areas can change from year to year as politicians expand their bailiwicks into new areas and abandon others (Ames, 2000) . The end result would be that changes in voting behavior in state and local races could reflect NGO funding, but may also include strong individual candidate effects.
Further, blank and null voting is highest in legislative elections -reaching 42 percent nationwide for federal deputies in 1994. Blank and null votes accounted for only 15 percent in the 1994 presidential race. Consequently, to study change in voting behavior for these races, we would have to make strong assumptions about the intentions of abstainers, who could be casting protest, apathy, or simply accidental blank votes.
Armed with electoral data and the amount of money disbursed to each municipality in Rondonia, we specified the following model to determine whether foreign funds had a positive, negative, or insignificant effect on support for the left from one election to the next, using the following model: 1998. Funding data came from a series of reports published by the Planafloro program office (Planafloro 1996; Planafloro 1997; ) and the
Ministry of the Environment (the G7 projects). Population data was obtained from IBGE's 1996 Contagem da População. (IBGE 1996).
Percentage of population in rural areas. We controlled for the percentage of the municipality's population living in rural areas. Distinguishing between primarily urban and rural areas is important for several reasons. First, the costs of mobilization will be higher for populations that are primarily rural. Rondonia is a region with few, poorly maintained roads. These areas have traditionally been dominated by conservative landowning organizations. All of these factors suggest that rural areas should react less to changes in the broader political environment. Specifically for the period we studied, rural voters might have been immunized from the unpopular impacts of Cardoso's economic program. If this were the case, we would expect this variable to be negatively associated with changes in the leftist vote share.
Percentage of population that are migrants. Previous research suggests the left
and in particular Lula have faired less well in communities with large numbers of migrants (Ames 1994) . We suspect that voters without past ties to local politics lack cues to orient them in their new political environment, and fall back on the modus operandi of Brazilian politics -patronage politics. The left traditionally has lacked the resources to adopt this strategy, relying instead on community organization. Hence the left should lose potential votes among recent migrants. Following Ames, we measure migration using the percentage of persons in the municipality from other states (IBGE 1996) .
Government employment as a percentage of total employment. Cardoso's reform package after 1994 included reducing the size and benefits of the public sector and privatizing state-owned industries. These policies made him less popular among public employees, and lent support to Lula who opposed privatization and public sector layoffs.
We use the percentage of the municipality's workforce employed in the public sector (IBGE 1996) .
Average number of years in school. Our model also includes the average years of education for heads of household in each municipality (IBGE 1996) . Education has an independent effect on voters' preferences. Including education serves two different purposes. First, educated voters are less vulnerable to clientelistic manipulation.
Educated voters consult various forms of media in order to obtain information on the issues central to the election, mitigating the advantages some candidates hold with their charismatic television and radio performances. Consequently, educated voters should have responded to the economic problems in Cardoso's first term, voting more leftist in the 1998 election. Second, income data were not available from the 1996 survey. Since
Rondonia has undergone such rapid development over the last decade, using outdated income data-from previous surveys-presents problems. Income, however, is highly correlated with education (Becker 1975; Psacharopoulos 1985) . Poor families cannot afford to send their children to school. The opportunity costs involved with sending a child to school-either the child can bring in much needed income for the family or provide a variety of domestic services-are simply too high for many poor families.
Consequently, education may serve as a proxy for income as well.
Partisan Identity of the Mayor in 1992 and 1996. Since our basic unit of analysis is the municipality, we include in the model important political information at the local level. Ames (1994) argues that there was a significant reverse-coattails effect in the 1989 20 presidential race: electoral returns for presidential candidates were strongly influenced by local party organization. We therefore include a variable that registers one if the mayor was from the left in 1996 but was not from the left in 1992, a negative one if the mayor was from the left in 1992 but not in 1996, and zero if the mayor was from the left in 1992 and 1996. As constructed, the variable assigns a higher value (1) to municipalities that recorded a shift to the left between 1992 and 1996 and assigns the lowest value to municipalities that recorded a shift to the right between 1992 and 1996. Unlike the slower-changing demographic variables, the political environment in a municipality can be dramatically changed by the election of a different mayor.
Finally, in addition to using Ordinary Least Squares, we weighted the observations in our model by the number of persons in each municipality. There is substantial variation in municipality size, from 300,000 in Porto Velho to 5,000 in Rio
Crespo. Since our dependent variable is effectively the difference between two averages, there should be less variance in the error term of the model from large cities than from small cities. The heteroscedasticity that this implies can affect the standard error of our coefficient estimates, leading scholars to incorrectly reject the null hypothesis. Weighting is a standard practice when using data of this type. As reported in Table 1 , weighting did not affect the substance of our conclusions.
Results
The estimates indicate there is a strong positive correlation between the flow of external resources to local NGOs and the left's share of the vote. The results, presented in Table   1 , are substantively and statistically significant. The regression model estimates the correlation between the funds distributed to NGOs by the Planafloro project and the change in the left's vote share from 1994 to 1998. These results were robust to multiple diagnostics including DFFITs, Cook's D, Leverages, as well as visually inspecting the residuals plotted against the predicted values. In addition to the variables reported in Table 1 , we varied the model using measures of population density, different levels of educational attainment, the percentage of a municipality's housing that represent nonpermanent structures (domicílios improvisados), and the number of residents per school.
Whether these variables were excluded or included had no significant impact on the results. Given the violent nature of the incident and its relevance to land reform-a hotly contested issue in the presidential campaign-we tested a model that included a dummy variable for the municipality in which the incident occurred, Corumbiara. Including this variable, however, and every other event-specific variable we could imagine had no impact on our results. NGO funding had a strong and stable relationship with increased votes for the left regardless of model specification.
We also tried different versions of the dependent variable. Instead of using the left's share of the vote as the dependent variable, we used the change in FHC's and Lula's share of the vote between 1994 and 1998. The results confirmed the previously reported pattern. Money allocated through the Planafloro project had a strongly negative impact on FHC's share of the vote from one election to the next. The correlation between Planafloro money and Lula's share of the vote was strongly positive. We also re-expressed the vote shares using the logit transformation since some municipalitiesmunicipalities with a very poor showing by the left in 1994-had more room to show improvement. Municipalities that already gave significant electoral support to leftist parties would have little room for improvement. This could artificially bolster our results.
Expressing the vote shares as logits solves the problems caused by a linear specification and actually strengthened our results.
Finally, we considered the possibility that the distribution of grant resources could affect our results. While our model controls for potential confounding variables, the pattern of grant distribution could bias our estimates. If the grants were allocated to municipalities based on the number of existing NGOs and their growing influence in an area, our finding that World Bank funding changed voting behavior may merely reflect the independent growth of NGO's and politicization in these communities.
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We do not believe that there is a selection bias problem, for four reasons. First, under Planafloro, 70% of the funds had to be distributed purely on geographical criteria.
The money was earmarked for municipalities in close proximity to extractive, indigenous, and forest reserves (Guajara Mirim, Porto Velho, São Miguel do Guaporé, Machadinho, Colorado do Oeste, Cacoal, and Ouro Preto do Oeste). Consequently, most of the funds were distributed to communities without regard to the level of local NGO activity. Second, the remaining 30% of the funds was allocated to a wide mix of municipalities in terms of previous support for the left, suggesting that pre-existing NGO's were not the main rationale for grant distribution patterns. Third, there is no correlation between the entire allocation of Planafloro money and support for the leftist candidates in 1994. Money was not funneled to municipalities that were leftist strongholds or to areas where there was growth potential for the leftist presidential candidate. Finally, the money required approval by a deliberative council comprised of individuals from a diverse cross-section of competing interests (see Appendix B), a group unlikely to systematically allocate funds to benefit the left.
Conclusion
Funding for NGOs designed to help the rural poor was associated with significant changes in the electorate's support for the leftist presidential candidate between 1994 and 1998. The findings support the hypothesis that NGOs generate a number of externalities that are not directly tied to their primary mission. In addition to providing the goods and services associated with their primary objectives, there is a clear political consequence to community-based NGO activity.
We showed as well that several specific mechanisms could account for the observed relationship. Resources distributed through the Planafloro program may have simply found their way to NGOs whose leadership was affiliated with the left and who, in turn, found creative ways to generate political support with the new-found resources.
Political entrepreneurs working among the rural poor may have found themselves, for the first time, in a position to provide important goods and services they could exchange for electoral support.
NGO activity may have also fostered political mobilization through increased associational activity. To the extent the newly funded NGOs provided increased contact among the rural poor, peasants were given the opportunity to express their concerns and problems. NGOs created by or kept alive through Planafloro money were able to get their message out through meetings and other organizational events whose primary purpose was apolitical. Under this scenario, NGOs successfully combined program administration (providing healthcare, education, etc.) with politics by using meetings and day-to-day contact to disseminate political views.
A third explanation is possible. NGO activity sparked an increase in social capital and civil society, mobilizing previously marginalized groups in society. Unlike the two previous explanations that draw direct links to NGO activity and changes in voting, this explanation introduces an important intervening factor: social capital. The difference is subtle but important. Whereas the previous explanations rely on the political orientation of those receiving the money, this one does not: it relies solely on the impact NGO resources have on the development of associational activity and increased community involvement among individuals. As communities develop social capital and higher levels of organizational capacity, they will be more equipped to press government for change.
Although we know there is a strong correlation between international resources, NGO activity, and voting behavior, we are unable to determine which of the explanations above accounts for the results. As stated at the outset, it could be one, two, or a combination of all the explanations. Our analysis, therefore, generates a number of important questions that can only be answered through further research.
We propose and encourage a research agenda on the mechanisms of NGOinduced political changes. Future work might be able to distinguish between the processes described above by collecting additional information on the nature and scope of landholders have traditionally exercised significant political power but now find themselves in a country undergoing democratization. The Planafloro project also symbolizes the current model of aid adopted by the World Bank, the UN, the EU, and other multi-lateral and bi-lateral aid donors. To the extent that similar projects in Africa, Asia, and other Latin American countries attempt to distribute resources to NGOs and other community-based organizations, the lessons from Rondonia will be relevant.
.
ENDNOTES
1 The one exception is a similar but much smaller (roughly 10 percent of Planafloro) program instituted by the Group of Seven (G7). The spending data we analyze includes the projects funded by the G7.
2 Although the funds originated as World Bank loans to the Brazilian government, they were distributed to the NGO's as grants and with no repayment obligation.
3 Most of the work on NGOs and politics focuses on the effect they have on specific issues (e.g., human rights, child labor, and the environment). Some draw connections between the growth of NGOs and democratization (Lehman 1990; Huntington 1991; Loveman 1991; Fox 1994; Abers 1996) . Still others suggest NGOs help foster activities that strengthen civil society, thereby increasing the accumulation of social capital (Fisher 1998 ) which figures prominently in theories of modernization (Huntington 1968) , government performance (Putnam 1993) , and the quality of democracy itself (Putnam 2000) . 4 Some of the best work on NGOs, in fact, has been sponsored by Oxfam (Clarke 1998) , Save the Children Foundation (Edwards and Hulme 1992) , The Inter-American Foundation (Carroll 1992) , and the Overseas Development Institute (Bebbington and Thiele 1993) .
5 See (Hecht and Cockburn 1990, 190-194; Hall 1997, 111-114) for a discussion of the worker's party and grass-roots organizations in Amazonia.
6 Although no statistics exist on the international flow of resources to local NGOs, evidence exists which confirms that the Planafloro project represents the first and only significant influx of resources to local NGOs in Rondonia either before or during the period under examination. Even resources from the Brazilian government were previously non-existent since NGOs "had been fragile institutionally and thus often shunned overtures by the State Government to participate in project activities for fear of being manipulated or co-opted" (Aparicio and Garrison 1999, 8 7 A more detailed treatment of the funding process is provided in Appendix B. Roughly 3 million dollars were distributed between the election in October and the end of the year.
The results reported in Table 1 include spending after the election (October -December).
We estimated the same models using spending data for only the amount disbursed before the election. Using the election date as a cut-off point had no significant impact on our results. 8 In 1998, Lula and FHC captured 88 percent of the vote in Rondonia. In 1994, the two candidates captured 85 percent of the votes cast in Rondonia. 9 An alternative model specification would include the same independent variables expressed in elasticities (change over time). Unfortunately, there is no data: although data exist for 1996, comparable data do not exist for an earlier time period. We were able to calculate the change in each municipalities rural population from 1996 to 2000.
Including it in the regression model did not effect our results.
10 See Achen for a clear exposition of selection bias, the problems it creates, and possible solutions (Achen 1986) . 11 We would like to thank Barry Ames for pointing this out. 
Appendix B Distribution of Project Funds
The PAIC projects were approved by a Grupos de Análises Técnicas, or GAT, (UNDP workers/técnicos). After approval, the request was forwarded to PAIC management (Planafloro office) The only remaining complication is how to re-aggregate the data when more than one municipality contributed to a new municipality. For example, Alto Alegre do Parecis (no relation to Parecis) was formed with territorial contributions from Cerejeiras and Alta Floresta do Oeste. How should the 1998 votes from Alto Alegre do Parecis be counted?
Our solution was to divide the votes between the contributing municipalities according to the percentage of territory contributed. Since Cerejeiras contributed about 2% of the new municipality's population, and Alta Floresta do Oeste contributed about 98%, then 2% of the votes from the new municipality were added to Cerejeiras and the other 98% were added to Alta Floresta do Oeste's total. This approach ignores a potential ecological inference problem. However, since most of the new municipalities are small in size, any variance introduced by our approach should be negligible.
